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I. INTRODUCTION
In Strickland v. Washington the United States Supreme Court
formulated the test for determining whether counsel in a criminal case is
ineffective.' When the Court decided Strickland it created a doctrine of
enormous proportions, but with little impact-a legal tyrannosaurus rex
without teeth.2 In the last decade, by using American Bar Association
("ABA") standards 3 to evaluate counsel's performance, the Court has given
the T-Rex some sizable incisors. The purposes of this article are to: (1)
determine how frequently the United States Supreme Court uses ABA
standards in its decisions and describe briefly for what purposes the Court
uses those standards; (2) describe in some detail the decision of Strickland v.
Washington and its test for determining whether counsel was ineffective; (3)
describe the decisions of Williams v. Taylor,4 Wiggins v. Smith,5 and
Rompilla v Beard,6 and their implications on the test formulated in
Strickland as to how the ABA standards relate to defense counsel's duty to
investigate; (4) report on the ABA's efforts to discover and describe the
causes of ineffective assistance; and (5) suggest changes that tighten the
Strickland test, giving it more traction as a guide for the courts in measuring
counsel's performance.
II. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS AND THE SUPREME COURT
Before turning to Strickland, a review of the Court's use of the ABA
standards indicates their prevalence in the Court's decisions.
The Court has used ABA standards in a variety of contexts, making the
Court no stranger to ABA standards. They are used as primary and
secondary authority in majority, concurring,7 and dissenting8 opinions. As
1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
2. Id. at 668.
3. The most recent standards are published in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed.
1993) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
4. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
5. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
6. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
7. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (determining
whether granting a continuance for substitute counsel to prepare for trial denied the defendant
effective assistance of counsel); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 433 n.13 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (determining whether the public and the
press could be excluded from a pretrial suppression hearing); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 550
n.20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (determining the constitutional
parameters of prison searches).
8. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 108-09 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(determining the vagueness of a city ordinance); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 214-15
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the admissibility for impeachment purposes of statements
made during a plea); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 364 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(determining the admissibility of a defendant's statement offered for impeachment); Caplin &
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early as 1971, the Court used the ABA standards in determining whether a
defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.9 In the following years the
Court used the standards when addressing a number of issues presented,
ranging from the conduct of criminal'0 and civil" proceedings to the
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(determining whether attorney's fees are exempt from a federal forfeiture statute); Ky. Dep't of Corr.
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 468-69 n.4 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (determining whether a
state corrections department could restrict visitation); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 352-53
n.5 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining whether a dismissal of a federal indictment for a
violation of a speedy trial rule is appropriate); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 797-98 n.4 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (determining whether defense counsel had a conflict of interest where
counsel's partner represented a co-indictee in a separate prosecution); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
112 n.14 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation
restricting inmate marriages and correspondence with other inmates); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491,
520-21 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (determining whether the
failure to record the reasons for not calling witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing violates due
process); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 195-96 n.3, n.4 (1984) (White, J., dissenting)
(determining the appropriateness of standby counsel's participation in the trial of a defendant
representing himself); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 445 n.39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(determining whether a parental notification statute was constitutional); United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 421 n.3 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (determining whether inmates who escaped from
prison are entitled to instruction on the defenses of duress or necessity); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 34 n.16 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part)
(determining whether a parole procedure complies with due process).
9. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 n.12 (1971). In Marion, the Court cited the
ABA standards' definition to determine when the delay period commences. Id.
10. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005) (determining whether the restraint of a
prisoner in the presence of the jury is permissible); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)
(determining counsel's obligation to file a notice of appeal in a criminal case); Mu'Min v. Virginia,
500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991) (determining whether a defendant in a criminal case had a fair and
impartial jury); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 337 (1989) (determining whether a jury should
consider mental retardation and abuse during the death penalty phase of a trial); McCoy v. Ct App.
of Wis., Dist. 1,486 U.S. 429, 436 n.8 (1988) (determining whether a state rule requiring counsel to
state why an appeal is frivolous is constitutional); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 418 (1987)
(determining whether the use of a death-qualified jury when the death penalty is sought only against
a codefendant violated the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury); New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 717 (1987) (determining whether a statutorily authorized warrantless search of a vehicle
dismantling establishment falls within the administrative inspection exception); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314 n.37 (1987) (determining whether racial discrepancy in the imposition of
the death penalty violated constitutional safeguards); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 (1986)
(determining whether additional security placed in the front row of a spectators' section deprived the
defendant of a fair trial); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170-71 n.6 (1986) (determining whether
trial counsel was ineffective for threatening to withdraw as counsel based on defendant's perjury);
Davis v. Florida, 473 U.S. 913, 915 (1985) (mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (determining that a
petition for certiorari that raised the issue of pretrial publicity should have been granted); Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (determining whether a sentencing court must take into account
alternatives to incarceration at a probation violation hearing); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 n.7
(1985) (determining whether an indigent defendant was entitled to an expert witness at the state's
expense); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.8 (1984) (evaluating jury instructions in a capital
case); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (determining whether appellate counsel is
obligated to raise every issue a client desires); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 121 n.4
determination of ethical boundaries applied to attorneys.12  It is not
surprising that in 1984, when the Court was asked to formulate a test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, it turned to the ABA standards.
III. THE STRICKLAND TEST
A. Enunciation of the Strickland Test
In the 1984 case Strickland v. Washington, the Court referred to the
ABA standards in formulating the test to determine whether defense counsel
was ineffective. 3 The defendant pled guilty to three capital murder charges,
against trial counsel's advice. 14 The trial court commended the defendant
for accepting responsibility, but made no promises regarding the sentencing
decision. 5 Trial counsel did not present any evidence during the subsequent
sentencing hearing and, instead, relied on the plea colloquy with the court.'
6
(1980) (determining whether a statute authorizing the government to appeal sentences violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 n.11 (1980) (determining whether
representation of multiple defendants in a criminal case violated the defendants' right to effective
assistance of counsel); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 n.2 (1977) (determining whether a
federal collateral attack of a guilty plea entered in state court was proper); Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 669 n.10 (1983) (determining whether a court should revoke a defendant's probation for
failure to pay a fine and restitution).
11. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 759-60 (2005) (determining
police liability for a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 322 n.48 (2001) (determining whether an immigration statute could be applied retroactively);
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 398 n.9 (1987) (determining whether an agreement
where a defendant in a criminal case forgoes the right to pursue a civil action in exchange for
dismissal of the criminal charges is constitutional); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25
(1976) (determining whether a prosecutor is immune from civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (determining whether a public defender
was acting under the color of state law, thus subjecting the office to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).
12. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1036-37 (1991) (determining whether a
state supreme court sanction for a lawyer's pretrial press conference is constitutionally permissible);
Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039, 1042 (1990) (mem.) (determining whether a conflict of interest
resulted from a literary agreement between defense counsel and their client); United States v. Sells
Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 430 (1983) (determining whether disclosure of grand jury materials to a
government attorney is proper); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423, 434 (1982) (determining whether federal courts should abstain from intervening in state
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Services of Durham County,
N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (determining whether counsel should be appointed to indigent parents
in a termination proceeding); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 270-71 n.15 (1981) (determining
whether a conflict of interest existed in counsel representing both employee and employer).
13. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
14. Id. at672.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 673 (noting that the trial judge told respondent that he had "a great deal of respect for
people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility," but that he was making no
statement at all about his likely sentencing decision).
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The sentencing judge found a litany of aggravating factors, and the
defendant was sentenced to death.'7
Subsequently, the defendant claimed that trial counsel's efforts
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.' 8 The defendant challenged six
aspects of counsel's performance: (1) failure to move for continuance to
prepare for sentencing;' 9 (2) failure to request a psychiatric report;20 (3)
failure to investigate and present character evidence;2' (4) failure to present
meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge;22 (5) failure to investigate the
medical examiners' reports;2 3 and (6) failure to cross-examine the medical
experts called by the state at the sentencing proceeding.24
The claims were reviewed in both state court 5 and the federal courts. 26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a
criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance
of counsel. 27
The Court began its analysis by stating that everyone has the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to protect their fundamental right to a fair
trial.28  The Court defined a fair trial as one where "evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal," and the right to
17. Id. at 674-75. The Court stated:
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances with respect to each of the three
murders. He found that all three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel,
and all involved repeated stabbings. All three murders were committed in the course of
at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and since all involved a robbery, the
murders were found to be done for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed to
avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder law enforcement. In the course
of one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave risk
of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the murder victim's sisters-in-law, who
sustained severe and ultimately fatal injuries.
Id.
18. Id. at 674.
19. Id. at 676.
20. Id. at 675-76.
21. Id. at 675. "In support of the claim, respondent submitted 14 affidavits from friends,
neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so." Id.
22. Id. at 675-76. The Court noted trial counsel's strategic decisions to rely on the plea colloquy,
so as to (1) minimize the client's exposure to cross examination and (2) preclude the state from
putting on its own psychiatric evidence. Id. at 673. The Court also commented on the waiver of a
presentence investigation that would have proven to be more "detrimental than helpful." Id.
23. Id. at 675-76.
24. Id. at 676.
25. Id. at 675-78.
26. Id. at 678-83.
27. Id. at 684.
28. Id.
counsel plays a "crucial role.",29  The Court went on to recognize that a
person's right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective assistance
of counsel.3 °
The Court established the guiding policy in evaluating counsel's
performance to be "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result. '31 The decision also established the principle
that the penalty phase of a capital case is the equivalent of a trial of the
underlying charge regardless of where the case is tried.32
The Court then articulated what has become known as the Strickland
test for ineffective assistance of counsel. 33  The test involves a two-step
analysis. The first is a determination of whether counsel's performance was
within the range demanded of lawyers in criminal cases. The second is a
determination of whether the proceeding's result would have been different
had counsel not made unprofessional errors.34
The Court reasoned: "In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim,
the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice
as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, are guides
to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.
35
29. Id. at 685.
30. Id. at 685-86. As the Court explained:
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused,
however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a
role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays
the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel."
Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
3 I. Id. at 686.
32. See id. at 686-87 ("A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case ... is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards ... that counsel's
role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing
process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision [sic].") (citations
omitted).
33. Id. at 687.
34. Id. The court explained that when presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
[flirst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that
the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
Id.
35. Id. at 688 (internal citations omitted).
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In a cautionary tone the Court advised lower courts not to adopt
"detailed rules, 36 and also advised courts to give great deference to
counsel's performance.37 The Court remarked that "detailed guidelines
could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of
the defendant's cause." 38 In a surprising revelation, the Court noted that the
goal of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance is "not to
improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of
considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to
ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. ' 39 This comment by the
Court generates the perception that a lawyer's performance is static rather
than evolving, meaning that what would pass in 1980 as adequate
performance would be the same in 2007. This ignores advancements in
technology, especially those in forensic science such as DNA testing. The
"presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance" 40 has led to a number of decisions
allowing questionable attorney behavior to fall within the range of adequate
assistance of counsel.
With regard to the duty to investigate, the Court held that "counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.' While addressing the
performance of counsel in Strickland, the Court found that counsel's actions
were reasonable and any prejudice that accrued was insufficient to set aside
the death sentence.42
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall pointed out the porous nature
of the Strickland test:
36. Id. at 688-89. The Court noted that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Id. The
Court was concerned that detailed rules would "interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel" and restrict choices. Id. at 689.
37. Id. The Court averred that "scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential."
Id. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. Courts "must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance . I..." d. The Court then commented on the various strategies that could be adopted by
counsel. Id. at 689-90.
38. Id. at 689.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 691.
42. Id. at 689-99.
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court
is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip
at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the
Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts ....
In my view, the Court has thereby not only abdicated its own
responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the
ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs.
The debilitating ambiguity of an "objective standard of
reasonableness" in this context is illustrated by the majority's
failure to address important issues concerning the quality of
representation mandated by the Constitution .... It is also a fact
that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants in
different parts of the country varies significantly. Should the
standard of performance mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary
by locale? The majority offers no clues as to the proper responses
to these questions.43
B. Initial Application of the Strickland Test
Strickland was decided on May 14, 1984. 44 On October 29, 1984,
Justice Marshall used Strickland and the ABA Standards in evaluating a
petition for certiorari in Alvord v. Wainwright.45  Once again, the Court
faced the question of trial counsel's competence in investigation of a death
penalty case.46 Although the Court declined to grant certiorari, the dissent
outlined trial counsel's lack of investigation.4 7
Alvord, the petitioner, was convicted of multiple murders in Florida
after escaping from a mental hospital in Michigan.48 The petitioner was
committed to the mental health facility in Michigan as a result of being
found not guilty by reason of insanity for rape and murder.49
A part-time public defender was appointed to represent Alvord. He
refused to talk with the lawyer.50 After learning from the prosecutor that
Alvord was previously found not guilty by reason of insanity, "[c]ounsel
moved for a mental examination. '" Alvord refused to talk to the
43. Id. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 668 (majority opinion).
45. Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 956-57 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 956.
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psychiatrists without counsel, but did speak with a psychiatrist who knew
him from Michigan. 2 The psychiatrist was brought into the case by the
State. 3 The trial court subsequently found Alvord competent to stand trial.
5 4
In spite of Alvord's lengthy mental health history and having been
previously found not guilty by reason of insanity, counsel did not conduct
an "independent investigation into Alvord's history of mental illness."55
Other than the contact with the psychiatrist brought into the case by the
State, the attorney did not consult with the other treating psychiatrist from
Michigan and only obtained a small portion of his client's medical records. 6
He did not obtain an independent expert to review the portion of the medical
records he did obtain. 7 Nor did counsel contact Alvord's lawyer in
Michigan to discuss Alvord's condition or the viability of any defense. 8
This is especially troubling given Florida's defendant-friendly law, which
creates a presumption of insanity and places the burden of proof on the state
to prove the defendant is sane beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.5 9 Other
jurisdictions commonly place the burden of an insanity defense on the
defendant.6 °
Instead, trial counsel relied on the defendant's assertion of a "frivolous
alibi defense.' Assuming counsel was reasonable in concluding the
52. Id. at 957 n.I. Alvord did speak to the two psychiatrists after speaking to the psychiatrist
from Michigan. One determined that Alvord was competent to stand trial; the other could not draw a
conclusion. Id.
53. Id. at 957.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 957-58.
56. Id. at 958.
57. Id.
58. Id. Justice Marshall wrote:
At the federal habeas hearing, one of Alvord's Michigan psychiatrists testified:
Now, as his lawyer, at that time, Mr. Richey, was a very competent individual.
Mr. Alvord would not cooperate and initially we were feeling very much we
were going to again have to find him incompetent, but we had a sixty day
period during this, worked with him, and I think it was after about a month we
finally got sufficient work done to cooperate, but this took a lot of work on
Mr. Richey's part in terms of seeing him, letting him know what was going
on, letting him feel that he really was being represented, and I worked with
him during this period also. But, there was a built in core of feeling about
lawyers and the same thing was seen here, so that the similarity was certainly
a warning.
Id. at 958 n.3 (emphasis in original).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (holding that the Oregon statute that
placed the burden on the defendant to establish insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt was
constitutional).
61. Alvord, 469 U.S. at 959-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
investigation into his client's background would not yield valuable evidence,
it is disturbing that counsel only spent fifteen minutes with Alvord outside of
court proceedings to discuss the case.62
Marshall's dissent details counsel's obligation to inform a client and
quotes the ABA standards extensively, stating:
The lower court ruling is therefore premised on a significant
misunderstanding of the division of responsibility between counsel
and client at trial, and of the obligation of counsel to inform himself
and advise his client, as set out in the ethical standards of the
American Bar Association. As this Court recognized last Term,
those standards act as guides in determining the reasonableness of
counsel's assistance.63
Although the Court denied the petition in Alvord, the Court would return
to the ABA standards as a basis to evaluate defense counsel's performance
in a number of decisions with less than satisfactory reviews. 64
C. Early Condemnation of the Strickland Test
This highly elastic approach used to address claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel has been condemned for allowing substandard
performance by defense counsel.65 Stephen Bright published a law review
article ten years after Strickland, chronicling conduct that had passed as
effective assistance in death penalty cases. 66  The first case Bright cited
involved counsel who was drunk at trial, did not investigate allegations of
abuse by the victim, and failed to adequately prepare an expert witness on
domestic violence.67  Bright went on to cite cases where counsel had not
fully investigated clients' background information relating to mental health
issues, and therefore did not present the evidence to the jury.68 Bright noted
62. Id. at 957.
63. Id. at 960 n.4.
64. See infra Part IlI.C, Part IV.C.
65. Adam Hime, Life or Death Mistakes: Cultural Sterotyping, Capital Punishment, and
Regional Race-Based Trends in Exoneration and Wrongful Execution, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
181 (2005); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV 425
(1996); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) [hereinafter Bright, Counsel for the
Poor]. However, as Stephen Bright has suggested, "in [Strickland) the standard of representation in
death penalty cases has been brought down to meet the kind of representation that poor people
receive." Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime, " But
Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 479, 497 (1995).
66. Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 65.
67. Id. at 1835-36 (citing State v. Haney, No.7 Div. 148 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); Haney v. State,
603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Exparte Haney, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992)).
68. Id. at 1837. The author Bright cites to instances, in both state and federal court, involving
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that the causes of the failure to investigate are inexperience, incompetence,
and lack of adequate funding.69 With regard to the "presumption" of
competence in Strickland, Bright's critique is blunt and unyielding:
There is no basis for the presumption of competence in capital
cases where the accused is represented by counsel who lacks the
training, experience, skill, knowledge, inclination, time, and
resources to provide adequate representation in a capital case. The
presumption should be just the opposite-where one or more of
these deficiencies exist, it is reasonable to expect that the lawyer is
not capable of rendering effective representation. Indeed, the
presumption of competence was adopted even though the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, who joined in the majority in
Strickland, had written and lectured about the lack of competence of
trial attorneys.7 °
Later, in 1994, Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion from the
denial of a writ of certiorari, voiced criticism of Strickland.7 1  He cited
instances of substandard attorney conduct allowed to pass under Strickland,
echoing Bright's concerns and citing his article.7 2 Blackmun concluded:
Our system of justice is adversarial and depends for its
legitimacy on the fair and adequate representation of all parties at
all levels of the judicial process. The trial is the main event in this
system, where the prosecution and the defense do battle to reach a
inadequate investigation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986) (discussing counsel's failure to mention that defendant suffered from
schizophrenia); Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (setting aside death sentence on
other grounds), affd sub nom. Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407 (1 th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Holoway v.
State, 361 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. 1987) (discussing counsel's failure to mention that defendant had an
IQ of forty-nine and an intellectual capacity of a seven year old); Peter Applebome, Two Electric
Jolts in Alabama Execution, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1989, at A6 (noting that when newspapers first
reported that the defendant was mentally retarded, at least one juror stated that, had she known, she
would not have voted for the death penalty).
69. Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 65, at 1849.
70. Id. at 1863 (citation omitted).
71. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Nor is a capital defendant likely to be able to demonstrate that his legal counsel was
ineffective, given the low standard for acceptable attorney conduct and the high showing
of prejudice required under Strickland v. Washington. Ten years after the articulation of
that standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has
failed to protect a defendant's right to be represented by something more than "a person
who happens to be a lawyer."
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 65.
presumptively reliable result. When we execute a capital defendant
in this country, we rely on the belief that the individual was guilty,
and was convicted and sentenced after a fair trial, to justify the
imposition of state-sponsored killing. And when this Court curtails
federal oversight of state-court proceedings, it does so in reliance on
the proposition that justice has been done at the trial level. My 24
years of overseeing the imposition of the death penalty from this
Court have left me in grave doubt whether this reliance is justified
and whether the constitutional requirement of competent legal
counsel for capital defendants is being fulfilled. It is my hope and
belief that this Nation soon will come to realize that capital
punishment cannot morally or constitutionally be imposed. Until
that time, however, we must have the courage to recognize the
failings of our present system of capital representation and the
conviction to do what is necessary to improve it.
7 3
IV. THE TURNING POINT: WILLIAMS, WIGGINS, AND ROMPILLA
A. Williams v. Taylor1
4
The issue of inadequate investigation by defense counsel continued
throughout the 1990's, highlighted by rising criticism of counsel's
performance in death penalty cases. The year 2000 represented a watershed
year for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.75 The United States
Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor found defense counsel ineffective for
failure to investigate a client's background in a death penalty case.76 The
death of the victim was attributed to alcohol poisoning until Williams wrote
a letter to the police confessing he had killed the victim and had stolen three
dollars from him.77
During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced
evidence of prior crimes, a written confession given by Williams, as well as
two separate "violent assaults on elderly victims" committed after the
murder for which Williams was on trial.78 One confession of an assault on
73. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 1264 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
75 See STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.state.il.us/defender/report/complete-report.pdf. The
governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on the death penalty. Id. at i. He then ordered the
establishment of a commission to investigate the death penalty, following the reversal of thirteen
death row inmates' convictions. Id.
76. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.
77. Id. at 367-68.
78. Id. at 368.
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an elderly woman was significantly harmful to Williams because "the
woman was in a 'vegetative state' and not expected to recover., 79 He was
also convicted of arson for setting fire to the jail while awaiting trial. 80 The
prosecution called two experts who testified there "was a 'high probability'
that Williams would pose a serious continuing threat."8
Defense counsel countered the prosecution's case by calling Williams's
mother and his two neighbors, and also by showing a taped excerpt from a
statement of a psychiatrist.82 Their testimony characterized Williams as a
"nice boy" and not a violent person.83 During cross examination of the
state's witness, counsel focused on the confession, highlighting the fact that
Williams had implicated himself in the murder and other unsolved crimes.84
Williams's counsel concluded by arguing that it would be "very difficult to
ask you to show mercy to a man who maybe has not shown much mercy
himself."85
What counsel did not discover, and the jury never heard, was a recount
of "extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish
childhood. 86 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's finding that:
[T]he jury would have learned that Williams' parents had been
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings,
that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father,
that he had been committed to the custody of the social services
bureau for two years during his parents' incarceration (including
one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents' custody.87
Trial counsel also failed to present to the jury "evidence that Williams
was 'borderline mentally retarded"' and had not advanced beyond the sixth
grade.88 Testimony could also have been presented by prison officials that
Williams, as an inmate, was "least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 368-69.
82. Id. at 369.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 369 n.2.
86. Id. at 395. Trial counsel incorrectly believed state law prohibited the disclosure of juvenile
records. Id.
87. Id. (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 396.
provocative way."' 9 Defense counsel could have included evidence to show
that Williams thrived in a more structured atmosphere, as shown through his
education efforts while incarcerated. 90  This, of course, would directly
contradict the state's experts' conclusion that Williams posed a "serious
continuing threat."9' These failings may easily be attributed to the fact that
counsel did not start preparing for the sentencing phase until the week before
trial.9
The Supreme Court in reversing stated:
But as the Federal District Court correctly observed, the failure to
introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that
did speak in Williams' favor was not justified by a tactical decision
to focus on Williams' voluntary confession. Whether or not those
omissions were sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome
of sentencing, they clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did not
fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the
defendant's background.9 3
Factually, the omissions in Williams v. Taylor look strikingly similar to
those in Strickland v. Washington. Both cases involve a failure to
investigate as well as a failure to adequately prepare for the sentencing phase
of a death penalty case.94 The question becomes whether or not Williams
signals a change in the way the Court is reviewing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, keeping in mind that the Strickland test remained the
same. As the Supreme Court appeared to reassess Strickland in light of
inadequate investigations, lower courts were also looking more closely at
trial counsel's investigation. 95 More evidence that the Court was tightening
up standards came in 2003.
89. Id.
90. Id. Williams earned a carpentry degree while incarcerated. Id.
91. Id. at 368-69.
92. Id. at 395.
93. Id. at 396 (citing 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, cmt. at 4-55 (2d ed.
1980)).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25, 86-92.
95. See, e.g., Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 152 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576-77 (D. Del. 2001). Stevens
"was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree" and sentenced to life in a
Delaware state court proceeding. Id. at 565. In reviewing the investigation conducted by counsel,
the trial court noted that the attorney only contacted people suggested by the defendant despite
knowing that the defendant was an unreliable witness concerning the events of the night in question.
The court stated: "An attorney's performance is deficient when he or she fails to conduct any
investigation into exculpatory evidence and has not provided any explanation for not doing so." The
court found the attorney's work to be inadequate largely based on his failure to investigate. Id. at
576-77.
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B. Wiggins v. Smith
96
In Wiggins v. Smith the Supreme Court found defense counsel
ineffective based on the failure to conduct an adequate investigation into the
client's background.97 Wiggins was indicted for the murder of a seventy-
seven year old woman who was drowned in her bathtub.95  After conviction
by the trial court, Wiggins chose to be sentenced by a jury.99 During this
phase of the proceedings, Wiggins' attorney did not present any evidence of
Wiggins' history. 00  According to subsequent testimony offered at a
postconviction proceeding, a number of mitigating factors were present,
including his abusive and neglectful upbringing by his mother,'0 ' abuse
while in foster care,' °2 his life on the street and return to foster care, 103 and
abuse suffered in a job training program.'°4
Reviewing trial counsel's failure to conduct a thorough investigation
into Wiggins's history, the Court noted that "[clounsel's conduct similarly
fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the
American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have
referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.'""05
96. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
97. Id. at 524.
98. Id. at 514.
99. Id. at 515.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 516-17. The Court noted:
[P]etitioner's mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home
alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage. Mrs.
Wiggins' abusive behavior included beating the children for breaking into the kitchen,
which she often kept locked. She had sex with men while her children slept in the same
bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner's hand against a hot stove burner-an
incident that led to petitioner's hospitalization.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
102. Id. "At the age of six, the State placed Wiggins in foster care. Petitioner's first and second
foster mothers abused him physically, and, as petitioner explained to Selvog, the father in his second
foster home repeatedly molested and raped him." Id. at 517 (internal citation omitted).
103. Id. "At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and began living on the streets. He
returned intermittently to additional foster homes, including one in which the foster mother's sons
allegedly gang-raped him on more than one occasion." Id. (internal citation omitted).
104. Id. The Court noted that after foster care, Wiggins was sexually abused by a supervisor
while in Job Corps. Id.
105. Id. at 524-25 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)). The Court in Wiggins also stated that "[t]he ABA Guidelines provide
that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be
introduced by the prosecutor.' Id. (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C), 93 (1989) [hereinafter ABA
DEATH PENALTY] (emphasis added by the Court)). The Court then admonished counsel for failing
C. Rompilla v. Beard 0
6
Within two years of the Wiggins decision the Supreme Court reversed a
third death penalty case based on trial counsel's inadequate investigation. In
Rompilla v. Beard, the Court again cited the ABA standard for investigation
in criminal cases to reverse a conviction for capital murder.10 7 Rompilla was
charged with the death of an individual who had been repeatedly stabbed
and set on fire. 10 8 The prosecution introduced evidence of three aggravating
factors: "that the murder was committed in the course of another felony; that
the murder was committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant
history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence."10 9
In postconviction proceedings, Rompilla's new counsel argued trial
counsel had failed to perform an adequate investigation into Rompilla's
background."0  Trial counsel had not investigated Rompilla's troubled
childhood, mental illness, and alcoholism, but instead relied on Rompilla's
"description of an unexceptional background.""'1 Trial counsel, knowing of
the prosecution's intention to introduce evidence of Rompilla's prior
conviction for rape and assault, had not bothered to look at the prosecutor's
file. 1 2 The Court declared:
The notion that defense counsel must obtain information that
the State has and will use against the defendant is not simply a
matter of common sense. As the District Court points out, the
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice in
circulation at the time of Rompilla's trial describes the obligation in
terms no one could misunderstand in the circumstances of a case
like this one:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The
to pursue his obligation to investigate the petitioner's background and cited the ABA standards,
which provide that counsel should consider presenting topics such as "medical history, educational
history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile
correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences." Id. (emphasis in original).
106. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
107. Id. at 387.
108. Id. at 377-78.
109. Id. at 378.
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id. at 378-79.
112. Id. at 385-86. "Reasonable efforts certainly included obtaining the Commonwealth's own
readily available file on the prior conviction to learn what the Commonwealth knew about the crime,
to discover any mitigating evidence the Commonwealth would downplay and to anticipate the
details of the aggravating evidence the Commonwealth would emphasize." Id.
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investigation should always include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists
regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the
lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated
desire to plead guilty.
1 3
The Court in Rompilla noted that the ABA standard had been amended
in 1993, but found there was no material difference. 14 The Court again
stated: "[W]e long have referred [to these ABA Standards] as 'guides to
determining what is reasonable.""' 5 The Court also approvingly remarked
on the ABA's adoption of ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases in 1989.116 In a footnote the
Court gave a history of the guidelines as applied in death penalty cases. The
Court stated:
Later, and current, ABA Guidelines relating to death penalty
defense are even more explicit:
Counsel must . . . investigate prior convictions ...
that could be used as aggravating circumstances or
otherwise come into evidence. If a prior conviction is
legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.
Counsel may also find extenuating circumstances that can
be offered to lessen the weight of a conviction.
Our decision in Wiggins made precisely the same point
in citing the earlier 1989 ABA Guidelines."
17
113. Id. at 387 (citing I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)).
114. Id. at 387 n.6. The Court explained:
The new version of the Standards now reads that any "investigation should include
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement
authorities" whereas the version in effect at the time of Rompilla's trial provided that
the "investigation" should always include such efforts .... We see no material
difference between these two phrasings, and in any case cannot think of any situation
in which defense counsel should not make some effort to learn the information in the
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-4.1).
115. Id. at 387 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003)).
116. Id.at387n.7.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
In Rompilla, the Court held that trial counsel's investigation fell "below
the line of reasonable practice.""' 8 The Court noted that by looking at the
file, counsel would have found "a range of mitigation leads that no other
source had opened up."" 9 In summary, the Court held that the "evidence
adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for
mercy actually put before the jury."'120
D. Effect of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
The effect of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla is a detailed analysis of
trial counsel's preparation and investigation, especially in death penalty
cases by both state and federal courts.
In Coleman v. Mitchell, one of the early applications of Williams, the
Sixth Circuit reversed a capital murder conviction. 12 ' Again, the reversal
was based on trial counsel's lack of investigation into mitigating facts that
would be relevant to the penalty phase of the trial.'22 Coleman presented an
interesting argument advanced by the government. The petitioner had stated
his desire to conduct a mitigation phase proceeding using the petitioner's
own unsworn statement. 23 The district court found that trial counsel had
honored the petitioner's request and therefore did not provide substandard
representation.124 An analogy was drawn between the limited representation
presented in this case with a self-representation request. 125 The Sixth Circuit
rejected the analogy, finding that counsel had never had a colloquy with the
defendant that advised him of the dangers of his approach to the penalty
phase of the case. 126 The court further found that the petitioner's request did
not excuse trial counsel's duty to conduct an independent investigation.1
21
118. Id. at 390.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 393.
121. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001). Williams v. Taylor was decided on April
18, 2000. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Coleman v. Mitchell was decided on October
10, 2001. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 417.
122. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 444-53.
123. Id. at 445.
124. Id.
125. Id. at448-449.
126. Id. The court compared the case at bar to Faretta v. California, a case where an
unrepresented defendant was charged with grand theft, and had previously represented himself.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). In Faretta, the superior court judge had a discussion
with the unrepresented defendant, explaining the applicable criminal statutes and trial procedure. Id.
at 808-10. Ultimately the court in Coleman decided the case at bar was distinguishable because in
Coleman, there was no showing that the defendant understood his rights, understood the danger of
self-representation, or was making the decision of his own free will. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 449.
127. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 449-50.
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The court's finding is in harmony with the general duty to investigate as
stated in the ABA standards cited by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Taylor:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of
the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to
facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event
of conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of
the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.
128
After Wiggins, the Sixth Circuit further articulated a more detailed
analysis of defense counsel's duty to investigate mitigating circumstances.
In Hamblin v. Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus
based on trial counsel's failure to investigate mitigating circumstances in a
death penalty case.2 9 The court used both the 1989 ABA guidelines and the
2003 Guidelines to amplify counsel's obligation to conduct an
investigation.13° Central to the court's finding was the premise that:
[T]he Wiggins case now stands for the proposition that the ABA
standards for counsel in death penalty cases provide the guiding
rules and standards to be used in defining the "prevailing
professional norms" in ineffective assistance cases. This principle
128. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.) (subsequently cited
with approval by the Supreme Court in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005)).
129. Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 493-96 (6th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 487. The court stated:
The ABA standards are not aspirational in the sense that they represent norms newly
discovered after Strickland. They are the same type of longstanding norms referred to in
Strickland in 1984 as "prevailing professional norms" as "guided" by "American Bar
Association standards and the like." We see no reason to apply to counsel's performance
here standards different from those adopted by the Supreme Court in Wiggins and
consistently followed by our court in the past. The Court in Wiggins clearly holds that it
is not making "new law" on the ineffective assistance of counsel either in Wiggins or in
the earlier case on which it relied for its standards.
New ABA Guidelines adopted in 2003 simply explain in greater detail than the
1989 Guidelines the obligations of counsel to investigate mitigating evidence. The 2003
ABA Guidelines do not depart in principle or concept from Strickland, Wiggins or our
court's previous cases concerning counsel's obligation to investigate mitigation
circumstances.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
adds clarity, detail and content to the more generalized and
indefinite 20-year-old language of Strickland. 131
The court was not troubled by the fact that the petitioner's trial occurred
prior to the adoption of the 1989 standards. 132 Needless to say, state courts
seized on the Williams and Wiggins application of ABA standards as well as
their detailed factual inquiry into counsel's performance.
An example of this detailed analysis is found in In re Lucas.'3 3 The
California Supreme Court vacated a capital murder conviction after
appointing a special master to conduct an investigation into trial counsel's
failure to adequately investigate.134 Although trial counsel did interview the
petitioner's wife, mother and sister, counsel only briefly explored the
petitioner's history surrounding his childhood. 35  The California court
specifically found that the petitioner was in and out of foster homes growing
up, and that when his birth mother reclaimed him, there was evidence he had
been beaten.' 36 After the abuse was discovered the petitioner was placed in
an abused children's facility where they verified that the petitioner had been
severely abused and, as a result, had suffered advanced emotional trauma.'
37
Records and witnesses of the petitioner's tragic childhood were readily
available to trial counsel.
138
This detailed finding by the court highlights the fact analysis done by
the United States Supreme Court in Wiggins.139  The court consistently
referred to the findings in Wiggins, saying:
As the United States Supreme Court has instructed: strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be
131. Id. at 486.
132. Seeid. at488.
133. 94 P.3d 477 (Cal. 2004).
134. Id. at 512.
135. Id. at486-87.
136. Id. at 486.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 140
The Court's use of ABA standards 14 1 as a means to measure a lawyer's
performance in death penalty cases signifies a change that may subject
attorneys to valid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This use of the
ABA standards was not envisioned by the drafters of the standards. Both the
current prosecution standards and defense standards begin with an
admonition by the drafters:
These standards are intended to be used as a guide to
professional conduct and performance. They are not intended to be
used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of
[prosecutor/defense counsel] to determine the validity of a
conviction. They may or may not be relevant in such judicial
evaluation, depending upon all the circumstances.
142
In spite of the cautionary note by the ABA, the Court is using the
standards in evaluating counsel's performance. In doing so, the Court has
given teeth to the test for ineffective assistance articulated in Strickland.
The invocation of the ABA standards does not automatically mean a
reversal of a conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Courts throughout the country routinely reject claims of ineffective
assistance. 143  However, the evolving use of the ABA standards has
heightened the scrutiny courts use in evaluating counsel's performance over
the years. Despite the favorable trend of ineffective assistance cases, the
Strickland test is still criticized for setting the constitutional and ethical
safeguards too low. 144 Eliminating the Strickland requirement that "a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance"'145 is one step the Court
may wish to take in order to focus more closely on counsel's performance.
Looking at the language of Williams, 46 Wiggins,147 and Rompilla,14 1 the
140. Lucas, 94 P.3d at 502 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
141. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-1.1 et seq. (Defense Function).
142. Seeid. at 3-1.1, 4-1.1.
143. See, e.g, Vinson v. True, 436 F.3d. 412, 419 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding there was no ineffective
assistance of counsel by distinguishing the case at bar from Wiggins).
144. See Myrna S. Raeder et al., Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent: Recently Adopted
ABA Policies, 20 CRIM. JUSTICE 4, 16-18 (2006).
145. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
146. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000).
147. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003).
Court may have in fact abandoned the presumption in favor of a detailed
factual analysis of the alleged breach of duty. If that is the case, then the
abandonment of the presumption is well justified and long overdue. Where
the Court is headed is, as always, subject to speculation by commentators.
However, if the Court continues to follow the principle of adequate
investigation fleshed out in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, a look at the
American Bar Association's recent studies may serve as a guide for what
defense counsel can expect.
V. EVOLVING ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS
In 2004 the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants outlined the minimum steps defense counsel
should take to adequately represent clients charged with a crime. 149 The
Committee found that defense counsel should:
[K]eep abreast of the substantive and procedural criminal law in the
jurisdiction; 150 avoid unnecessary delays and control workload to
permit the rendering of quality representation;15 1 attempt to secure
pretrial release under condition most favorable to the client;'52
prepare for a initial interview with the client; 153 seek to establish a
relationship of confidence and trust with the client and adhere to
ethical confidentiality rules; 154 secure relevant facts and background
from the client as soon as possible;' 55 conduct a prompt and
thorough investigation of the circumstances of the case and all
potentially available legal claims;
156 avoid conflicts of interest; 157
148. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005).
149. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter ABA,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE].
150. Id. at 15 (citing NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 1.2 (1995) [hereinafter NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES]).
151. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-1.3).
152. Id. (citing NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 2.1).
153. Id. (citing NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 2.2).
154. Id. (citing ABA. TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM § 4 (2002); ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-3.1; NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES
§ 5.10 (1976) [hereinafter NAT'L STUDY COMM'N]).
155. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-3.2; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 2.2; ABA DEATH PENALTY, supra note 105, § 10.5).
156. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-4.1; ABA DEATH PENALTY, supra
note 105, §§ 10-7, 10-8; NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 4.1); see also
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding that counsel's decision not to expend investigation
beyond presentence investigation and Department of Social Services records fell short of
professional standards).
157. ABA, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 149, at 15 (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
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undertake prompt action to protect the rights of the accused at all
stages of the case;' keep the client informed of developments and
progress in the case; 5 9 advise the client on all aspects of the case;
160
consult with the client on decisions relating to control and direction
of the case; 161 adequately prepare for trial and develop and
continually reassess a theory of the case; 162 explore disposition
without trial; 163 explore sentencing altematives;' 64 and advise the
client about the right to appeal. 165
Most of the committee recommendations follow a common sense
approach to criminal defense practice. Should the judiciary assume most
lawyers conform their practice habits to these recommendations?
Unfortunately, the committee's findings indicated there are system-wide
failures throughout the United States.1
66
The committee, through various witnesses and documentary evidence,
found the practice of providing defense counsel fell short in several
aspects. 167 The report issued by the committee cited many troubling issues
in criminal defense work, including: "Meet 'em and Plead 'em" lawyers;
16
incompetent and inexperienced lawyers; 169 excessive caseloads; 7 ° lack of
supra note 3, at 4-3.5; NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 4-1.3).
158. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-3.6; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 5.1, 5.2, 5.3).
159. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-3.8, 4-6.2; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 6.3).
160. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-5.1; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 6.4).
161. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-5.2; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 6.1, 6.3).
162. Id. (citing NLADA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 4.3, 7.1; ABA DEATH
PENALTY, supra note 105, § 10.10.1).
163. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-6.1; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 6.1, 6.2).
164. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-8.1; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 8.1-8.7; ABA DEATH PENALTY, supra note 105, § 10.11-10.12).
165. Id. (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-8.2; NLADA, PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 150, § 9.2; ABA DEATH PENALTY, supra note 105, § 10.14).
166. See id. (citing failures in adequate counsel, lack of funding, inadequate attorney
compensation, and lack of training).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 16. Several of the witnesses provided examples which characterized exchanges
between attorneys and their criminal defendant clients as nothing more than "hurried ... moments
before entry of a guilty plea and sentencing." Id.
169. Id. at 16-17. Several documented instances exist where lawyers with little or no experience,
sometimes fresh out of law school, are appointed to represent indigent defendants. Id. Other cases
illustrate how attorneys appointed in such criminal matters lack training in criminal defense. Id.
contact with clients and continuity in representation;' 7' lack of investigation,
research, and zealous advocacy;' lack of conflict-free representation; 7 3 and
ethical violations of defense lawyers.
17 4
After these findings the questions become why do these problems exist
and what can be done? As previously stated, the courts are starting to use
ABA standards to evaluate defense counsel performance. The problem is
not a lack of standards; it is the bench and the bar's lack of enforcement of
existing standards. Again the case is made for the abandonment of
Strickland's presumption of counsel's effectiveness.' 75
VI. ETHICAL SANCTIONS FOR REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF STRICKLAND/ABA
STANDARDS
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel provides a specific remedy
for the defendant in a criminal case-reversal of the conviction. 76  In a
larger sense, ineffective assistance jeopardizes the profession and public by
allowing attorneys who are not competent to continue practicing in a field
where life and liberty are at stake. Thus the law should provide not only a
remedy for the criminal defendant harmed by the ineffective assistance, but
also provide a remedy for the legal profession through ethical sanctions.
The ABA standards are corollaries to the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. The ABA standards reference the ABA Model Code as a
related standard. For example, the ABA's guideline regarding the duty to
investigate, referred to in the above section, cites the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.'77 The Ethical Considerations section of the
ABA Model Code provides that "a lawyer should act with competence and
proper care in representing clients.' 78 In addition, the Model Disciplinary
170. Id. at 17 ('[O]ftentimes caseloads far exceed national standards, making it impossible for
even the most industrious of attorneys to deliver effective representation in all cases.").
171. Id. at 18. Witnesses have provided evidence to show that indigent criminal defendants often
have very little contact with their appointed counsel. Id. Moreover, they are often appointed
different attorneys throughout their court proceedings, instead of having the opportunity to establish
a close attorney-client relationship. Id.
172. Id. at 19 ("Witnesses from a number of states indicated that, in many cases, indigent defense
attorneys fail to fully conduct investigations, prepare their cases, or advocate vigorously for their
clients at trail and sentencing.").
173. Id. at 19. Attorneys have frequently represented multiple criminal defendants in the same
case. This constitutes a conflict of interest for the attorney and is an express violation of the rules of
professional conduct. Id.
174. Id. at 20. Ethical issues not only arise from conflicts of interest, but also from the actions of
attorneys who are not diligent in their representation of indigent criminal defendants.
175. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
176. Id. at 687.
177. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4-4.1 (Duty to Investigate) (noting MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 as a related standard).
178. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1, reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 239 (2004) [hereinafter ABA
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Rules provide that: "A lawyer shall not ... [h]andle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances . . . [nor] [n]eglect a matter
entrusted to him."'
179
A. In re Miller
Several jurisdictions have suspended attorneys for neglecting their
clients' criminal cases. In the case of In re Miller, the Indiana Supreme
Court suspended an attorney's license to practice law for sixty days.'80 The
suspension was based on three findings of misconduct. The first was for
neglecting a defendant's armed robbery case. I8 ' On April 6, 1999, the
attorney entered an appearance. 182 The defendant was incarcerated, but the
attorney did not meet with the client until February of 2000, at the client's
second court appearance. 183 At the time, the attorney promised to meet with
the client within two weeks, but failed to do so. 184 The defendant pled guilty
to burglary and robbery and received a nine year sentence, four years of
which were suspended.'85
This attorney's second ethical violation involved a client who was
charged with residential entry.' 86 The attorney entered an appearance on
October 29, 2000.187 The client was unable to contact the attorney, and the
attorney failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. 188 At another hearing on June
6, 2001,189 the client pled guilty as charged and received credit for time
served. 190 The attorney's third violation was the refusal to respond to the
disciplinary commission. 191
COMPENDIUM].
179. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101, reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM, supra
note 178, at 240.
180. In re Miller, 759 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. 2001).








189. Id. The court attributes the June 6 hearing to the year 2000. This of course would be




B. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee upheld the two-year suspension of an attorney's license to
practice law.' 92 The attorney, who had never represented anyone facing a
felony charge, accepted a client charged with first degree murder.'93 The
court found the attorney did not talk to witnesses, including potential alibi
witnesses, and did not attempt to discover the case the state was going to
present. 194 The court also concluded the attorney did not understand the
rules of criminal procedure. 95 Astonishingly, the attorney filed an answer
and an amended answer to the murder indictment, as if it were a civil
action. 9 6 In the amended answer, the attorney detailed his client's version
of the offense without determining whether his client had made a previous
statement to the police. 97 The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that without
the statement in the amended answer, the state "would have had difficulty in
getting by the 'directed verdict' stage in any trial on the indictment."'' 98 The
court went on to describe two other civil cases mishandled by the attorney.' 99
C. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Dumke
In a variant of the "meet 'em and plead 'em" theme,200 a Wisconsin
attorney was retained to represent a client who had been convicted and
sentenced in a sexual assault case where the state sought to commit the client
as a sexually violent person. 20 1 The attorney had never represented a client
subject to commitment under the sexually violent person provision of the
Wisconsin statutes. 20 2 The attorney did not explore the factors used by the
state to determine who would qualify for commitment pursuant to the
statute.20 3 Also, the attorney did not seek experts who could evaluate the
client even though the statute provided for court appointed experts and the
client's mother had offered to pay to retain an expert.2 4 What the attorney
192. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, 664 S.W.2d 62, 64-65 (Tenn. 1983).
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id. at 63.





199. Id. at 63-64.
200. See supra note 168.
201. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Dumke, 635 N.W.2d 594, 595-96 (Wis. 2001).
202. Id. at 596-97.
203. Id. at 596.
204. Id. at 596-97. The explanation tendered by the attorney was that he did not want to retain an
expert because he might bolster the state's case. Id. This was rejected by the court since the expert
would not have disclosed unfavorable results unless the expert testified. Id. at 597.
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did do was to appear on the trial date, waive his right to trial, and admit to
the allegations by the state.20 5 Subsequently the attorney stipulated to being
confined to a mental health facility.2 0 6  The Wisconsin Supreme Court
suspended the lawyer's license for two years.20 7
D. Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Middleton
The Court of Appeals in Maryland suspended an attorney's license for
three years based on various forms of neglect in four cases. 20 8 In the first
case, the lawyer represented a client charged with criminal assault and use of
a handgun.20 ' The client was convicted at trial and sentenced to a five-year
term of incarceration. 2'0 The conviction was ultimately set aside in the post
conviction relief hearing where the state conceded the attorney had provided
ineffective assistance. 21 The court found trial counsel had failed to:
(a) Meet with and go over possible defense strategies with his
client; (b) Pursue a motion to suppress evidence that may have been
illegally obtained; (c) Present evidence in support of an intoxication
defense that may have been available to his client; (d) Prepare
adequately to cross-examine the State's witnesses; (e) Prepare and
submit voir dire; (f) Prepare and request specific jury instructions
applicable to the charges in the case; and (g) Object to possibly
improper jury instructions prejudicial to his client.212
In the subsequent disciplinary proceedings the court found the attorney
had violated Maryland's Disciplinary Code by failing to provide
competent213 representation and counsel had "engage[d] in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice. 2 4
205. Id. at 596.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 598.
208. Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Middleton, 756 A.2d 565, 568-74 (Md. 2000).
209. Id. at 568.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. These findings were made by a judge in a bar proceeding and subsequently adopted by
the Maryland Court of Appeals.
213. Id. at 568 n.l. "Rule 1.1, 'Competence,' provides: 'A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."' Id.
214. Id. at 568 n.2. "Section (d) of Rule 8.4, 'Misconduct,' provides: 'It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice . I...' Id.
In the second case cited by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the attorney
undertook representation of a client charged with first degree rape in
October of 1997.15 In April of 1998, on the day of trial, counsel had not
filed any discovery requests or pretrial motions and moved for a
continuance, complaining of a physical ailment. 16 The court continued the
case but removed the attorney.2 17 In the disciplinary proceeding, the court
found the lawyer had failed to act with diligence.218
The third case involved a misrepresentation to a judge regarding an
appearance in a different court in order to obtain a continuance. 2 19 Upon
checking, the judge determined the representation was false.22 0  This
precipitated the filing of a criminal contempt action that resulted in an
eighteen-month suspended sentence with the imposition of a number of
conditions of probation, including the surrender of the attorney's law license
for one year.22' In the disciplinary case, the court concluded the lawyer
engaged in misconduct by knowingly making a false statement to the
court. 222 In the fourth case, involving a client charged with possession and
intent to distribute cocaine, the attorney failed to appear for a scheduled
trial. 23 Finally, the attorney failed to respond to the bar complaints.224
Enforcing ethical rules through attorney disciplinary proceedings would
send a powerful message to lawyers. As states continue to address
attorneys' misconduct, the standards are given meaning and usefulness. In
turn, this will diminish the instances that the ABA committee reported of
"meet 'em and plead 'em lawyers," incompetent and inexperienced lawyers,
and other examples of ineffectual counsel. 2 ' The more the standards are
enforced, the better the legal profession will be.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court has tightened counsel's
duty to investigate, not by changing the test formulated in Strickland, but by
using the ABA standards as an evaluative tool rather than mere "guidelines."
This evolution was caused by the Court having to adapt to changing
215. Id. at 569.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 569 n.3. "Rule 1.3, 'Diligence,' provides: 'A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client."' Id.
219. Id. at 569-70.
220. Id. at 570.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 570 n.5. "Section (a)(1) of Rule 3.3, 'Candor toward the tribunal,' provides: 'A lawyer
shall not knowingly... make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal . I..."' Id
223. Id. at 571.
224. Id.
225. See ABA, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 149, at 20.
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circumstances. The change to a more active use of the standard was needed
because of counsel's performance documented over the years since
Strickland.226 This evolution should continue with the American Bar
Association honing its standards to fit the heightened expectations of
counsel's performance. 22' The evolution also must include the evaluation of
counsel's performance by courts and, when necessary, taking the appropriate
disciplinary actions. Criminal defense lawyers who practice without
consulting the ABA standards do so at their professional peril. Thanks to
the evolution of Strickland and the adoption of ABA Standards as more than
mere guidelines, the originally useless Strickland tyrannosaurus now has
teeth.
226. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
227. See ABA, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 149.
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